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MARRIED COUPLE, SINGLE RECIPIENT: 
UNDERSTANDING THE EXCLUSION OF 
GIFTS AND INHERITANCES  
FROM DEFAULT MATRIMONIAL 
REGIMES 
 
Laura Cárdenas 
 
In most Canadian jurisdictions, default family property law 
regimes exclude gifts and inheritances from the property 
that will be divided between divorcing couples. In Quebec, 
this exclusion is not only present in the default regime (the 
partnership of acquests) but rendered mandatory by the 
public order nature of the “family patrimony”—a 
construct determining the property that will be shared 
equally between spouses upon their divorce. This article 
examines default regimes of family property in Ontario and 
Quebec and analyzes the justifications provided by the 
provincial legislators for excluding gifts and inheritances 
from the mass of assets that will be divided between the 
spouses. The article then traces the various ways in which 
gifts and inheritances, both within and outside the couple, 
have been restricted through Roman, civil, and common 
law, and finds that these restrictions are tied to a desire to 
maintain property within the spouses’ natal families. 
Finally, the article argues that the exclusion of gifts and 
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inheritances points to a conception of the family tied not to 
marriage and choice, but to “family” understood as 
bloodlines, which is out of step with today’s contemporary 
values and betrays the portrait of marriage otherwise 
painted in family property legislation.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Upon divorce, legal separation, or death, 1  separating 
spouses or their successors must go through the difficult 
process of separating their assets. The rules for dividing 
assets are set out either in the couple’s marriage contract 
(when applicable) or by the default matrimonial regime of 
the jurisdiction in which the couple first domiciled.2  In 
Quebec, the default matrimonial regime (the partnership of 
acquests) supplements the “family patrimony”—a 
construct of public order that lists specific kinds of 
property to be shared equally between spouses upon their 
divorce.3 In Canada, matrimonial regimes fall under the 
                                                 
1  Among other circumstances. For an exhaustive list of circumstances 
that will bring matrimonial regimes to an end, see e.g. arts 417, 465 
CCQ; Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 5 [Ontario FLA]. 
2  But note that the public order provisions of the family patrimony apply 
only to couples who are Quebec residents at the time they file for 
divorce, separation, or at the time of their death (see arts 391, 3089 
CCQ; Michel Tétrault, Droit de la famille, 4th ed, vol 1 (Cowansville, 
Que: Yvon Blais, 2010) at 156). 
3  See arts 414–26 CCQ (family patrimony); arts 448–84 CCQ (regime 
of acquests). See also art 391 CCQ (public order nature of the family 
patrimony); art 432 CCQ (default nature of the partnership of 
acquests); Droit de la famille – 08316, 2008 QCCA 285, [2008] RDF 
25 at para 17. 
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jurisdiction of the provinces, 4  most of which displaced 
common law provisions on family property through 
legislative reforms in the 1970s–1990s. Despite important 
differences between some of these regimes, in particular 
between the civilian regime of Quebec and the common 
law regimes, the basic organisational structure of default 
matrimonial regimes is the same: it is determined that a 
core mass of assets belongs to both spouses together and as 
such must be shared between them upon the end of the 
marriage, while other assets belong to the spouses 
individually and are thus excluded from the shared mass of 
assets. 5  Gifts and inheritances are consistently found 
among these excluded assets. In this article, we analyze the 
justifications for this exclusion provided or implied in 
reports published during the reform of matrimonial 
regimes, using mainly Quebec and Ontario as examples 
(Part I). We then trace the various ways in which gifts and 
inheritances within and outside the couple have been 
restricted through Roman, civil, and common law and find 
that these restrictions are tied to a desire to maintain 
property within the spouses’ natal families (Part II). 
Finally, we argue that the exclusion of gifts and 
inheritances points to a conception of the family tied not to 
marriage and choice, but to “family” as bloodlines, which 
is out of step with today’s contemporary values and betrays 
the portrait of marriage otherwise painted in family 
property legislation (Part III).  
 
This article refers to legislation on “family property 
law”, but the definition of who constitutes a “family” for 
                                                 
4  See Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(13), reprinted 
in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5. 
5  See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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the purposes of this legislation is dependent on the 
jurisdiction. The provincial and territorial acts on family 
property, and the provisions of the Civil Code of Québec, 
were all drafted with married couples in mind. Quebec’s 
provisions on the family patrimony and the partnership of 
acquests also apply to couples joined in a civil union,6 but 
do not apply to de facto (or “common law”) spouses.7 By 
way of contrast, British Columbia considers de facto 
spouses as a married couple for the purpose of its Family 
Law Act.8 This article refers to “spouses,” meaning thereby 
any couple to whom the relevant property division regime 
applies. 
 
While this article focuses only on couples to whom 
a property division regime applies, our purpose is 
nonetheless to uncover something about the way our 
legislators consider the family more broadly: is the 
language of our legislation and its structure conceiving of 
the couple as a unit, or as a set of individuals, or as the 
temporary or permanent joining of two separate families? 
The answer to this question may be just as relevant for de 
facto spouses (or for other types of families that do not 
conform to traditional social norms) as it is for married 
ones. At a time where the rate of divorces remains stable 
but the average duration of marriages keeps decreasing,9 
                                                 
6  See art 521.6 al 4 CCQ. 
7  See Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 SCR 61 
(commonly known as Eric v Lola). 
8  See Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 3(1)(b) [British Columbia 
FLA]. 
9  See Statistics Canada, Marital Status: Overview, 2011, by Anne Milan, 
Catalogue No 91-209-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, July 2013) at 11, 
Table 2 and 12, Table 3. See also Statistics Canada, Families, Living 
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where non-traditional families gain in social acceptance 
and are increasingly the subject of studies, and where 
couples are thus re-defining the meaning of marriage and 
family for themselves and for society, questions about the 
way legislators define and conceive of the “family” gain in 
importance, as do the reasons for the division of property 
upon the end of a marriage or other stable relationship. 
 
I. GIFTS AND INHERITANCES IN CANADIAN 
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES IN THE 19TH AND 
20TH CENTURIES 
 
In this Part, we first outline the conceptual way in which 
today’s Canadian matrimonial regimes conceive of the 
couple’s property and the way it should be divided (Part I-
A), before providing an overview of the rules that were in 
place before these regimes and contextualizing the reforms 
that gave rise to them (Part I-B). This Part will then turn to 
the justifications that were provided at the time of the 
reforms for the exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the 
shared mass of assets (Part I-C). 
 
A. Exclusion of Gifts and Inheritances in Current 
Matrimonial Regimes 
 
All Canadian provinces and territories have, through 
legislation, put into place default regimes for the division 
of family property at the end of a marriage. In common law 
provinces, common law rules were displaced by provincial 
                                                 
Arrangements and Unpaid Work, by Anne Milan, Leslie-Anne Keown 
& Covadonga Robles Urquijo, Catalogue No 89-503-X (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada, December 2011) at 16. 
      CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 6
and territorial statutes starting in the 1970s,10  and have 
been subject to modifications and sometimes broader 
reforms since. 11  In Quebec, matrimonial regimes have 
been present since the reception of the Coutume de Paris 
in 1664,12 and were most recently modified in 1989 with 
the incorporation of the family patrimony as a public order 
overarching component of all matrimonial regimes.13  
 
The default regimes in these statutes all adhere to 
the same basic organizational structure, which can be 
conceptualized as follows: before their marriage, each 
spouse-to-be owns a basket of individual property; there 
are thus two baskets, each belonging to one of the spouses 
and containing their individual property. At the end of the 
marriage, there are three baskets: the spouses each own 
their individual basket, and share together a third basket 
containing the property that ought to be divided between 
them—what we have referred to above as a shared mass of 
assets. Given that the spouses have presumably shared their 
property with each other during the marriage, as well as 
                                                 
10  The first such legislation was Ontario’s Family Law Reform Act, RSO 
1980, c 152.  
11  See e.g. Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, Division of Family 
Property: Discussion Paper (Halifax: LRCNS, 2016). 
12  See Yves F Zoltvany, “Esquisse de la coutume de Paris” (1971) 25:3 
Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française 365 at 368; Michel Morin, 
“La réception de l’ancien droit et du nouveau droit français au Bas-
Canada, 1774-1866” in H Patrick Glenn, ed, Droit québécois et droit 
français : communauté, autonomie, concordance (Cowansville, Que: 
Yvon Blais, 1993) at 3. 
13  See An Act to amend the Civil Code of Québec and other legislation in 
order to favour economic equality between spouses, SQ 1989, c 55 [An 
Act to favour economic equality between spouses].  
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purchased new assets together, the classification of their 
assets into the various baskets can present a challenge. The 
primary purpose of matrimonial regimes is to classify the 
property into these different baskets, according to the rules 
of the regime. The shared basket, or shared mass of assets, 
bears different names depending on the regime and the 
statute—Ontario’s Family Law Act terms it “net family 
property”, 14  British Columbia’s Family Law Act refers 
simply to “family property”, 15 whereas others refer to it as 
“family assets”16 or “matrimonial assets”,17 and Quebec’s 
default regime under the Civil Code of Québec 
conceptualizes this shared core of assets as a combination 
of acquests and the family patrimony.18 Once the contents 
of this shared basket have been ascertained, the regime will 
also determine the way in which it will be divided between 
the spouses and join their individual baskets, and the 
considerations upon which this division can be departed 
from.19 Since this article will be focusing on the shared 
basket of property across various jurisdictions, we will use 
the terminology of “shared mass of assets” for consistency 
when referring to this concept across jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
14  See Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(1). 
15  See British Columbia FLA, supra note 8, s 84. 
16  See e.g. Family Property Act, CCSM, c F25, s 1 [Manitoba FPA]; 
Family Property and Support Act, RSY 2002, c 83, s 4 [Yukon FPSA]. 
17  See e.g. Family Law Act, RSNL 1990, c F-2, s 18 [Newfoundland and 
Labrador FLA]. 
18  See arts 448–49 CCQ (acquests); arts 414–15 CCQ (family 
patrimony). 
19  See e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 5; British Columbia FLA, supra 
note 8, s 93–97; arts 416, 423, 467, 471 CCQ. 
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The shared mass of assets is usually composed, 
across Canadian jurisdictions, of property acquired during 
the marriage by one of the spouses or by both spouses 
together, 20  and property used by the family. 21  In some 
jurisdictions, the shared mass of assets is defined by listing 
the types of property that are excluded from it, rather than 
those which are included, but its contents remain generally 
the same.22 In all cases, the legislation sets out a list of 
exclusions. The content of this list varies between 
jurisdictions, but all of the regimes list gifts and 
inheritances made to one spouse by a third party as an 
exception to the shared group of assets.23  
 
B. The Place of Gifts and Inheritances in Canadian 
Marriage Prior to the Reforms 
 
Until 1851, married women in Canada had no legal 
capacity to hold property, as they were subsumed into the 
                                                 
20  See e.g. Newfoundland and Labrador FLA, supra note 17, s 18(1)(c); 
The Family Property Act, SS 1997, c F-6.3, s 2 sub verbo “family 
property”; Marital Property Act, SNB 2012, c 107, s 1 sub verbo 
“marital property” at (b) [New Brunswick MPA]; art 449(1) CCQ. 
21  See e.g. New Brunswick MPA, supra note 20, s 1 sub verbis “family 
assets”, “marital property” at (a); art 415 al 1 CCQ. 
22  See e.g. Family Law Act, SNWT 1997, c 18, s 35 [Northwest 
Territories FLA]; Family Law Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-2.1, s 4. 
23  For regimes which exclude gifts and inheritances from the shared mass 
of assets, see e.g. 415 al 4, 450(2) CCQ; Ontario FLA, supra note 1, 
s 4(2); Newfoundland and Labrador FLA, supra note 17, s 18(1)(c)(i); 
British Columbia FLA, supra note 8, s 85(1)(b)–(b.1); Manitoba FPA, 
supra note 16, s 7(1), 7(3). For regimes that do not exclude gifts and 
inheritances outright, but list them as a reason to vary the division of 
property awarded to each spouse at the end of the marriage, see e.g. 
Yukon FPSA, supra note 16, s 4.  
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legal personality of their husband.24 In the common law, 
their situation is often described by reference to a quotation 
from William Blackstone:  
 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one 
person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during 
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: under 
whose wing, protection, and cover, she 
performs everything; and is therefore called 
in our law-french a feme-covert ... and her 
condition during her marriage is called her 
coverture.25 
 
Due to the “legal disabilities”26  that made them 
unable to hold property, wives’ rights as regards their 
property were vested in their husband, who gained the right 
to manage and gain profits from the property. 27  This 
included the wages gained by the wife if she worked during 
the marriage. 28  Wives’ interests in their property were 
                                                 
24  See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Property 
Law (Toronto: OLRC, 1993) at 3. 
25  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1 
(1765) at 442. See also Clara Brett Martin quoted in Constance 
Backhouse, “Married Women’s Property Law in Nineteenth-Century 
Canada” (1988) 6:2 L & Hist Rev 211 at 212. 
26  Alan M Sinclair & Margaret E McCallum, An Introduction to Real 
Property Law, 6th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2012) at 119. 
27  See Constance Backhouse, supra note 25 at 213. 
28  See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 3. 
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protected through three types of institutions: coverture, 
dower, and curtesy.29  
 
Canadian wives’ first rights to hold property were 
granted through a series of provincial reforms that started 
in 1851 with New Brunswick’s An Act To Secure to 
Married Women Real and Personal Property Held in Their 
Own Right. 30  This statute granted wives from New 
Brunswick ownership rights over the property they owned 
“before or accruing in any way after marriage,” with the 
exception of property given to them by their husband 
during the marriage. 31  Similar acts followed in Prince 
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Vancouver Island in the 
1860s. 32  These acts consisted in what Constance 
Backhouse terms “marriage breakdown legislation” and 
only meant to offer women some solace in cases where 
their marriage was imperiled by their husband’s absence.33 
They were followed by a wave of “protective legislation” 
intended to apply such rights to all married women, and a 
third wave of “egalitarian legislation” that finally 
                                                 
29  See Bora Laskin, Cases and Notes on Land Law (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1964) at 70ff.  
30  SNB 1851 (14 Vict), c 24 [Married Women Property Act]. See also 
Constance Backhouse, supra note 25 at 218.  
31  Married Women Property Act, supra note 30, ss 1–2. 
32  See An Act to Protect the Rights of Married Women, in Certain Cases, 
SPEI 1860 (23 Vict), c 35, ss 1–2 (Prince Edward Island); An Act for 
the Protection of Married Women in Certain Cases, SNS 1866 (29 
Vict), c 33 (Nova Scotia), ss 1–2; An Act to Protect the Property of a 
Wife Deserted by her Husband, SBC 1862 (26 Vict), c 116. 
33  See Constance Backhouse, supra note 25 at 217–21. 
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challenged the doctrine of marital unity. 34  Once such 
statutes passed, the de facto matrimonial regime in each 
province and territory became a separate property regime, 
whereby property rights remained vested in the spouse with 
title to that property.35 There was no shared mass of assets 
to include or exclude gifts and inheritances from, and 
therefore gifted and inherited property was treated like any 
other property. 
 
Quebec wives’ rights were similarly restricted by 
their limited legal capacity and the marital authority of 
their husbands under the Coutume de Paris36 and the Civil 
Code of Lower Canada.37 Their interests were protected 
through the civil law dower (douaire).38 Quebec wives’ 
legal emancipation was only achieved in 1964, with an act 
amending several articles of the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada and granting them “full legal capacity as to [their] 
                                                 
34  See ibid at 221, 230. Elements of the second wave were present in New 
Brunswick’s Married Women Property Act, supra note 30, and were 
central to Ontario’s Married Women's Property Act, SO 1884 (47 
Vict), c 19. The third wave was started by Ontario’s 1872 statute An 
Act to Extend the Rights of Property of Married Women, SO 1871-71 
(35 Vict), c 16. 
35  See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 4.  
36  See Zoltvany, supra note 12 at 369. See also David Gilles, “La 
condition juridique de la femme en Nouvelle-France: essai sur 
l'application de la coutume de Paris dans un contexte colonial” [2002] 
1 Cahiers aixois d'histoire des droits de l'Outre-mer français 77 at 93. 
37  See arts 174–77 CCLC; J Émile Billette, Traité théorique et pratique 
de droit civil canadien, vol 1 (Montréal: publisher unknown, 1933) at 
144; Gilles, supra note 36 at 81. 
38  See Mireille D Castelli, “L’évolution du droit successoral en France et 
au Québec” (1973) 14:3 C de D 411 at 445–52. 
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civil rights, subject only to such restrictions as arise from 
[their] matrimonial regime.”39  
 
Along with the Coutume de Paris, Quebec inherited 
a default matrimonial regime from French Law in 1664. 
This regime—that of the community of property40—was 
carried over to the Civil Code of Lower Canada 41  and 
remained the default regime until 1970.42 The community 
of property was composed of all the moveables belonging 
to the couple (whether obtained before or during the 
marriage, purchased or received by the spouses as a gift or 
an inheritance), all income from this property, and 
immoveables acquired during the marriage. 43  The 
community therefore excluded the product of a spouse’s 
labour and their immoveables (whether obtained by gift or 
inheritance, or owned before the marriage). Gifts and 
inheritances of immoveable property by an ascendant were, 
however, subject to a presumption that they should not go 
to the community of property, but to the donor’s 
presumptive heir (the spouse who would have inherited this 
                                                 
39  An Act Respecting the Legal Capacity of Married Women, LQ 1964, c 
66, s 1, amending art 177 CCLC. For a brief overview of the major 
elements of the evolution of family law since 1964 in Quebec, see 
Tétrault, supra note 2 at 15–20. 
40  See Zoltvany, supra note 12 at 368. 
41  See arts 1271–1367 CCLC, as amended by An Act respecting 
matrimonial regimes, SQ 1969, c 77 [Act respecting matrimonial 
regimes]. 
42  See Act respecting matrimonial regimes, supra note 41. See also 
art 1271 CCLC, as amended by Act respecting matrimonial regimes, 
supra note 41 (setting out the default status of the regime). 
43  See art 1272 CCLC, as amended by Act respecting matrimonial 
regimes, supra note 41. 
MARRIED COUPLE, SINGLE RECIPIENT 
 
13 
 
property at the death of the donor44), unless the donor stated 
clearly their desire for both spouses to be recipients of the 
gift, or for the spouse who was not their presumptive heir 
to be the beneficiary of the gift.45 The Civil Code of Lower 
Canada’s dispositions on the community of property could 
be displaced by entering a marriage contract that would 
arrange for the division of property in case of death or 
separation.46 Marriage contracts were commonly entered 
to arrange for separation as to property regimes and were 
irrevocable.47 
 
After the enactment of federal divorce legislation in 
1968,48 consultations were commenced in all common law 
jurisdictions to address the impact of divorce on married 
spouses, with reforms starting with Ontario’s first statute 
on family law (the Family Law Reform Act). 49  These 
reforms were motivated by the desire to bring more 
                                                 
44  See Robert P Kouri et al, eds, Private Law Dictionary and Bilingual 
Lexicons, 2nd ed (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 1991) sub 
verbo “presumptive heir”.  
45  See art 1276 CCLC. See also Part II-A-1, below. 
46  See art 1260 CCLC, as amended by Act respecting matrimonial 
regimes, supra note 41. Note that before 1970, once a marriage had 
been celebrated, it was impossible to change regimes (ibid). See also 
1257 CCLC. 
47  See art 1260 CCLC, as amended by Act respecting matrimonial 
regimes, supra note 41; Lionel Smith, “Intestate Succession in 
Quebec” in Kenneth GC Reid, Marius J De Waal & Reinhard 
Zimmerman, eds, Intestate Succession (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015) 52 at 58. 
48  See Divorce Act, SC 1968-69 (16 Eliz II), c 24. 
49  Supra note 10 (replacing The Family Law Reform Act, 1978, SO 1978, 
c 2).  
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equality between spouses upon their divorce and responded 
to the grossly unfair results of property division upon the 
divorce of women who had given up paying work 
opportunities to dedicate themselves to their family or the 
family business.50 The statute put in place the foundations 
of a regime that valued spouses’ work both outside and 
within the home. In Quebec, the partnership of acquests 
became the default regime in 1970 51  and the family 
patrimony was created in 1989.52 Both of these reforms 
also meant to respond to the inequalities created by the 
regime of separation as to property.53 Indeed, wives who 
separated or divorced under such a regime after having 
spent their married life working in the home—unpaid—
found themselves with little property in their personal 
                                                 
50  See especially Murdoch v Murdoch (1973), [1975] 1 SCR 423, 41 DLR 
(3d). 
51  See Act respecting matrimonial regimes, supra note 41. 
52  See An Act to favour economic equality between spouses, supra 
note 13. See also Anne Revillard, “Du droit de la famille aux droits des 
femmes : le patrimoine familial au Québec” (2006) 62:1 Dr et soc 95 
at 100 (for an overview of the political process leading to the adoption 
of the law). 
53  See Civil Code Revision Office, Report on Matrimonial Regimes 
(Montreal: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1968) at 10; MT v J-YT, 2008 
SCC 50 at 16, [2008] 2 SCR 781, Lebel J (describing the family 
patrimony as a response to the vulnerability of wives); Christine Morin, 
L’émergence des limites à la liberté de tester en droit québécois : étude 
socio-juridique de la production du droit (Cowansville, Que: Yvon 
Blais, 2009) at 321–27. 
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patrimony.54 In 1986, Ontario brought in a new, reformed 
Family Law Act.55  
 
Both Ontario reforms and the introduction of the 
“net family property” (Ontario’s shared mass of assets) 
were claimed to have been influenced by Quebec’s regimes 
in their conceptualization of a mass of assets as owned 
individually during the marriage, yet re-qualified as either 
belonging to one of the spouses, or both, at the time of its 
dissolution. This manner of conceptualizing the property—
as a deferred-sharing regime—was said to take inspiration 
from the civil law’s approach in the partnership of 
acquests.56 On the other side of the border, it was claimed 
that the family patrimony was emulating Ontario’s notion 
of “family assets”.57 Some authors further claimed that the 
qualification of property as part of the family patrimony 
due to its purpose (rather than its nature) was incompatible 
with the ethos of the civil law, and directly inspired from 
the recent Ontario reforms. 58  Quebec’s new notion of 
                                                 
54  See Revillard, supra note 52 at 96; Mireille D Castelli et Dominique 
Goubau, Le droit de la famille au Québec, 5th ed (Sainte-Foy: Presses 
de l’Université Laval, 2005) at 123–24. 
55  Ontario FLA, supra note 1 (replacing the Family Law Act, 1986, 
SO 1986, c 4). 
56  See Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law: Cases and 
Commentary, 2nd ed (Concord, Ont: Captus Press, 2015) at 692. 
57  See Danielle Burman, “Politiques législatives québécoises dans 
l’aménagement des rapports pécuniaires entre époux : d’une justice 
bien pensée à un semblant de justice—un juste sujet de s’alarmer” 
(1988) 22:2 RJT 149 at 172. The notion of “family assets” is defined 
in s 3(b) of the Family Law Reform Act, supra note 10. 
58  See e.g. Burman, supra note 57 at 174–75. See also Nicholas Kasirer, 
“Testing the Origins of the Family Patrimony in Everyday Law” 
(1995) 36:4 C de D 795 at 822–23 [Kasirer, “Testing the Origins”]; 
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marriage as a joint economic partnership was also claimed 
to have been inspired by notions of Equity. 59  The 
conversation between these advances in legislation 
between Ontario and Quebec might also serve to explain 
the similarity of both regimes in their exclusion of gifts and 
inheritances from the shared mass of assets.  
 
C. Today’s Family Law Regimes Promote the Joint 
Effort of the Spouses 
 
Neither the Civil Code of Québec, the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada, nor the various family property statutes 
implemented as a result of the reforms in common law 
provinces provide explanations for the exclusion of gifts 
and inheritances from the shared mass of assets. The 
contemporary legislative debates in common law provinces 
are equally silent. 60  The reports and academic articles 
commenting on the reform processes in Quebec and 
Ontario, however, provide some indications as to why the 
exclusions were put into place.  
 
                                                 
Pierre Ciotola, “Le patrimoine familial et diverses mesures destinées à 
favorises l’égalité économique des époux” [1989] 2 CP du N 21 at 
para 12 (stating that the legislation that put in place the family 
patrimony originated from Anglo-Canadian statutory law and common 
law). 
59  See Kasirer, “Testing the Origins”, supra note 58 at 797–98. See also 
Nicholas Kasirer, “Couvrez cette communauté que je ne saurais voir: 
Equity and Fault in the Division of Quebec’s Family Patrimony” 
(1994) 25:4 RGD 569 at 584. 
60  See e.g. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates 
(Hansard), 33-1 (6 June 1985) (Alan Pope), online: 
<www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-
33/session-1/1985-06-06/hansard> [Hansard Debates (Pope)]. 
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In reforming the default matrimonial regimes, both 
the Civil Code of Lower Canada and the common law 
statutes provided a new definition of marriage, centred on 
the notion of the family as an economic unit. They 
suggested that the division of assets upon divorce is 
focused on granting spouses an equal share of the property 
they had acquired as participants in the marriage—whether 
through the earnings of their paid labour, or the value of 
their work within the home.61  The Ontario statute, in a 
formulation that also inspired the Northwest Territories, 
equates marriage with “a form of partnership” or an 
“economic relationship”.62 While the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada and Civil Code of Québec do not contain such a 
statement of principle, the law that created the family 
patrimony stated that “[t]he object of this bill is to favour 
equality between spouses and to underline the character of 
marriage as a partnership.”63 
 
The Ontario Law Reform Commission (“the 
Commission”), in its 1993 Report on Family Property Law, 
                                                 
61  See Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 5(7); Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, supra note 24 at 11; 396 CCQ. 
62  Ontario FLA, supra note 1, Preamble; Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, supra note 24 at 1, 5. See also Northwest Territories 
FLA, supra note 22, Preamble. 
63  An Act to favour economic equality between spouses, supra note 13, 
Explanatory Notes. See also Burman, supra note 57 at 172, quoting 
Suzanne Vadboncœur, ed, Rapport sur la fiscalité, la prestation 
compensatoire et le partage des biens familiaux en mariage (Montréal: 
Barreau du Quebec, 1987) at 2; MT v J-YT, supra note 53, Lebel J; 
Kasirer, “Testing the Origins”, supra note 58 at 803–04 (arguing that 
this idea was already present prior to the reforms, although the 
language of economic partnership is new); Burman, supra note 57 
at 174. 
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justified the exclusions listed in subsection 4(2) of the 
Family Law Act on the grounds that those assets “are not 
the product of the marriage partnership.”64 Since Ontario’s 
Family Law Act was meant “to ensure that spouses share 
the value of assets accumulated during the marriage,”65 it 
seemed logical to the Commission that the types of 
property listed in subsection 4(2) (which also include, inter 
alia, damages for a personal injury, the proceeds of a life 
insurance, and some pensionable earnings) be excluded 
from such sharing. In Quebec, authors commenting on the 
reforms that created the family patrimony similarly made 
reference to the fact that gifts and inheritances do not result 
from the work of the spouses towards the marriage.66 The 
rationale expressed for the consideration of gifts and 
inheritances as private property (rather than acquests) in 
the regime of acquests is not as clear, with some authors 
simply deciding not to explain the exclusion,67 and others 
                                                 
64  Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 72. See also 
Hanoch Dagan & Carolyn J Frantz, “Properties of Marriage” in 
Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 219 (“[t]he most common justification given 
for treating gifts and inheritances differently is that neither requires 
spousal labor. Title to such property is ‘lucrative’ rather than 
‘onerous’”). 
65  Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 11. See also 
Hansard Debates (Pope), supra note 60; Ontario, Legislative 
Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 33-1, No 28 (22 
October 1985) (Terry O’Connor), online: 
<www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-
33/session-1/1985-10-22/hansard-1>. 
66  See e.g. Castelli & Goubau, supra note 54 at 131; Tétrault, supra 
note 2 at 227–28. 
67  See Castelli & Goubau, supra note 54 at 159. 
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seeming to state that their “personal value” justifies that 
they be considered private property.68 
 
In both the common law and the civil law, while 
gifts and inheritances are excluded from the shared mass of 
assets, the income from this property is only excluded if the 
donor or testator expressly specified that it should be so.69 
The provisions that plan for this inclusion suggest that the 
work of the spouses is not the only metric that is considered 
to justify the classification of property as part of the shared 
mass of assets. Indeed, the income arising from the gifted 
or inherited property during the marriage could presumably 
well be due to the combined efforts of the spouses, yet the 
statutes and the Civil Code of Québec only include this 
property into the shared mass of assets by default, leaving 
the final decision as to the inclusion or exclusion of this 
income to the testator or donor. Ontario’s Commission 
justifies the importance accorded to the will of the testator 
in this decision by pointing out that imposing such a 
division may affect the heir’s ability to retain the property 
if they have insufficient means to reimburse their divorcing 
spouse for half the capital growth or income without selling 
the property.70 In this same discussion, the Commission 
also makes reference to the emotional significance of the 
property that might be lost due to such a division of the 
                                                 
68  See Tétrault, supra note 2 at 520.  
69  See Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2); art 450(2) CCQ (qualifying this 
income as an acquest). Compare Alberta’s Matrimonial Property Act, 
which includes the increase in value of property received as a gift or 
an inheritance in the shared mass of assets (RSA 2000, c M-8, s 
7(3)(a)). 
70  See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 73–74.  
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increase in value, 71  although this aspect of the loss is 
deemed—to the Commission—justifiable in order to 
protect the policy considerations that justify dividing this 
increase in the first place.72 The mention of freedom of 
testation and personal or sentimental value to justify the 
exclusion or inclusion of property into the shared mass of 
assets points to a need to balance different legislative 
priorities and legal doctrines against the objectives put 
forward by the legislative reforms. It also reflects a 
potential conflict between the need to maintain coherence 
within private law and within the matrimonial regime 
itself. 
 
The reforms being justified by a push for greater 
equality between spouses and a desire to reward the work 
of both spouses in the household, the justification for these 
exclusions naturally had to be centred on these same 
principles.73 Yet, given the law’s long-standing discomfort 
                                                 
71  See ibid at 77. 
72  Such policy considerations mostly refer to the need to ensure 
consistency with the way the increase in value/income from the 
property is divided in cases of property inherited or received as a gift 
prior to marriage (see ibid at 76–77). 
73  In Ontario, see ibid at 5–6. See also Susan J Heakes, “Gifting Real 
Property to Married Children: The Creation of Legal Fictions to Avoid 
Section 4(2) of the Family Law Act” (2006) 25:2 Can Fam LQ 169 at 
170 (“[t]here has been no contribution by the spouse to the acquisition 
of the gifted home and in ignoring that it has been gifted, the spouse 
receives an arguably undeserved windfall in the event of separation or 
death”). In Quebec, see Burman, supra note 57 (commenting on the 
new family patrimony during the reforms). See also Tétrault, supra 
note 2 at 227–28 (“[l]'article 415, al. 4 C.c.Q. prévoit l'exclusion de 
biens qui, même s'ils ont une vocation familiale, ne sont pas 
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with gifts and inheritances, where transactions seem to 
flow only in one direction, without consideration or 
return,74 it is not surprising that jurists would be hesitant to 
discuss the ways in which the recipient of the gift or 
inheritance might have “earned” such generosity. While 
the exclusion of gifts and inheritances could have been 
justified by prioritizing the will of the testator or donor over 
the logic central to the matrimonial regimes, the decision 
to justify this exclusion within the framework of the family 
property statutes leads to the conclusion that the recipient 
must have “earned” the gift or inheritance somehow. 
Although gifts and inheritances, as liberalities, consist by 
definition of a “transfer, without a counterprestation, of 
property to the advantage of another,” 75  it is generally 
admitted that gifts are part of a broader network of 
exchanges and expectations.76 By this logic, the recipient 
would have earned the gift or inheritance through actions 
directed to the donor or testator prior to the transfer or 
expected to happen after the transfer—acts unrelated to the 
transfer itself, but related to the relationship between the 
donor or testator and the recipient. Indeed, for the purpose 
of legal consistency, only a focus on the relationship 
between the parties, rather than the actions that might have 
justified the transfer, could support the exclusion. A foray 
into the history of gifts and inheritances in married couples 
                                                 
comptabilisés pour le motif qu'ils n'ont pas été acquis en fonction de 
l'association économique des époux, donc par leurs efforts”). 
74  See Richard Hyland, Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) at para 6, 8 (“a distrust of gift giving 
has often haunted the law” at 6). 
75  Kouri et al, supra note 44, sub verbo “liberality” [emphasis added]. 
76  See Hyland, supra note 74 at 7. 
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confirms that relationships play a central role in explaining 
this exclusion. 
 
Prior to focusing on the historical treatment of gifts 
and inheritances in family contexts, however, we must 
address potential counterarguments to our focus on family 
relationships as the central determinant of the exclusion of 
these gifts and inheritances from the shared mass of assets. 
 
First, gifts and inheritances are not the only types 
of property consistently excluded from the shared mass of 
assets. Property such as awards for a personal injury, 
proceeds of a life insurance, and some pensionable 
earnings are also frequently found on the exclusions list in 
common law provinces. 77  The motives behind their 
exclusion has been the subject of as little discussion as that 
of gifts and inheritances, but may seem more intuitive. 
Damages for personal injury, for instance, seek to 
compensate an individual for a loss that they have suffered 
                                                 
77  For the exclusion of damages, see e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1, 
s 4(2)3 (“damages or a right to damages for personal injuries, nervous 
shock, mental distress or loss of guidance, care and companionship, or 
the part of a settlement that represents those damages”); British 
Columbia FLA, supra note 8, s 85(1)(c); Manitoba FPA, supra 
note 16, s 8(1); Newfoundland and Labrador FLA, supra note 17, 
s 18(1)(c)(ii); Northwest Territories FLA, supra note 22, s 35(2)(b). 
For the proceeds of life insurance, see e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1, 
s 4(2)4 (“proceeds or a right to proceeds of a policy of life insurance, 
as defined under the Insurance Act, that are payable on the death of the 
life insured”); Northwest Territories FLA, supra note 22, s 35(1)(c)(ii). 
For the exclusion of pensionable earnings, see Ontario FLA, supra 
note 1, s 4(2)7 (“unadjusted pensionable earnings under the Canada 
Pension Plan”). Other provinces’ legislation will include all 
pensionable earnings (see e.g. British Columbia FLA, supra note 8, 
s 84(2)(e); Yukon FPSA, supra note 16, ss 4(e)–(f). 
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in their personal capacity. They are not shared because 
what they represent—what they seek to “replace”—could 
not be shared in a mass of assets. One need only think of 
the loss of a limb or loss of enjoyment due to a trauma. As 
put by McKinlay J. in Mittler v. Mittler: “[t]he purpose can 
only be to permit spouses to retain for their own purposes 
property which is completely personal to them, and to 
which they are entitled for the purpose of replacing some 
aspect of their enjoyment of life which cannot be truly 
shared with any other individual, no matter how close the 
relationship.”78 A distinction is drawn between “general 
damages for pain and suffering together with any special 
damages that can be attributed directly to the personal 
injury, as opposed to lost income or other loss to the 
family.”79 The rationale behind the exclusion of general 
damages for a personal injury cannot be transposed to that 
of gifts and inheritances because these do not “replace 
some aspect of [the recipient’s] enjoyment of life” that 
cannot be truly shared with a spouse. If stretched, the 
comparison could apply to the bequest from a close relative 
of an item bearing very personal memories, but it could not 
be applied to any gift from a live third party. The rationale 
for excluding gifts and inheritances must then be sought 
elsewhere. 
 
The exclusion of unadjusted pensionable earnings 
from the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) from Ontario’s 
Family Law Act can be explained on jurisdictional grounds. 
CPP credit-splitting is already rendered mandatory as of 
1987 by article 55.1 of the Canada Pension Plan, which 
                                                 
78  (1988), 17 RFL (3d) 113 at para 72, 12 ACWS (3d) 125 (Ont HC). 
79  Hunks v Hunks, 2017 ONCA 247 at para 27, 97 RFL (7th) 89. 
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provides that “in the case of spouses, following a judgment 
granting a divorce or a judgment of nullity of the marriage, 
[a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings shall take 
place] on the Minister’s being informed of the judgment 
and receiving the prescribed information”.80 The exclusion 
of the proceeds of life insurance follows from that of 
inheritances, as they are funds received upon the death of 
an individual, predestined to a specific beneficiary. These 
two exclusions therefore shed no light on the motives 
behind the exclusion of gifts and inheritances. 
 
Second, it might be argued that all subsection 4(2) 
types of property are excluded simply because they do not 
respond to the chief criterion for what makes a shared asset; 
that is, one that is created by the joint efforts of the spouses. 
This is the explanation given by the Ontario and Quebec 
commentators. This explanation seems appealing, but as 
we have just seen, it does not apply to all the exclusions. 
Moreover, when applied to gifts and inheritances, it results 
from a generalization about the circumstances that give rise 
to these transfers. Yet, it is easy enough to consider a 
hypothetical situation where the efforts of a spouse 
permitted the other spouse to dedicate more time and 
energy to the care of an elderly or ailing relative, friend, or 
neighbour, who later thanked them with a gift or 
inheritance. This joint effort goes unrecognized under the 
current laws. As to the increase in value of gifted or 
inherited property during a marriage, the Ontario and 
Quebec legislators themselves recognized that the joint 
efforts of spouses are likely its cause; yet, they can easily 
be put aside by the clear intention of a donor or testator.  
                                                 
80  Canada Pension Plan, RSC 1985, c C-8, s 55.1(a). See also Payne v 
Payne (1988), 16 RFL (3d) 8 at para 10, 11 ACWS (3d) 174 (Ont HC). 
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It is clear that the joint efforts of spouses are not 
completely antithetical to the reception or increase in value 
of gifts and inheritances, but they are afterthoughts at 
best—when their presence is not completely dismissed by 
the legal provisions in place. Indeed, the legislature has 
placed the joint efforts of the spouses second to the 
intention of the testator or donor in cases where both 
spouses may be to thank for the actions that prompted the 
transfer or the increase in value of the property. This 
translates a presumption that in most cases gifts and 
inheritances have nothing to do with the joint efforts of the 
spouses. Our article now turns this presumption on its head 
and asks: if gifts and inheritances are not the result of the 
joint efforts of the spouses, what are they? Are they the 
result of individual endeavour? Are they so closely tied to 
an individual in their personal capacity that they are 
considered an extension of their being (as are damages for 
personal injury)? Through our exploration of the historical 
treatments of gifts and inheritances, we find that the answer 
lies between these possibilities: gifts and inheritances are 
treated as unrelated to the joint efforts of spouses because 
they are used as a protective mechanism for the bloodline’s 
property. This answer in turn leads us to question the 
exclusion altogether.  
 
II. GIFTS, INHERITANCES, AND THE FAMILY IN 
HISTORY 
 
As we have seen, gifts and inheritances are, according to 
the dominant commentary, not a result of the joint efforts 
of the spouses. While gifts are perceived by some 
commentators as the result of labour in a long-term 
relationship, or as a transaction within a series of market-
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type exchanges,81 this transactional type of analysis is not 
compatible with the matrimonial regimes’ exclusion of 
gifts and inheritances, which do include the fruits of labour 
of each spouse in their joint mass of assets. If gifts and 
inheritances cannot be defined, for the purposes of current 
matrimonial regimes, as born from the labour of either 
spouse nor of that of the couple, then they must arise from 
the relationship that links the donor or testator and the 
recipient. There are multiple ways that married couples can 
interact with gifts and inheritances: they can be the 
recipients of these liberalities, or they can be the donors or 
testators (and as such, they can select their spouse or a third 
party as a recipient). This Part will look at the way spouses’ 
ability to interact with gifted or inherited property has been 
restricted at various points in Roman, civil, and common 
law (Part II-A) and argue that these restrictions all share a 
common purpose: the desire to maintain the bequeathed 
property within the family, conceived as a bloodline 
(Part II-B). 
 
A. Gifts, Inheritances, and the Married Couple 
 
The exclusionary provisions we have analyzed thus far 
created a clear distinction between gifts made to a spouse 
by a third party, and gifts made to the spouse by the other 
spouse. In focusing on the former, they make no 
restrictions on spouses’ ability to make gifts to one another, 
or to make gifts to third parties. At various points in the 
past, however, family and succession law have restricted 
gratuitous transactions between the spouses’ families by 
limiting gift-giving and testamentary freedom in these 
                                                 
81  See Dagan & Frantz, supra note 64 at 219. See also Hyland, supra 
note 74 at 20–21. 
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three different types of interactions—which we will 
analyze in turn (Parts II-A-1 to II-A-3), although we will 
see that the structure of property law also contains certain 
rules intending to have the same effect (Part II-A-4). 
 
1. Gifts and Inheritances from Third Parties 
 
Canadian legislation on family property specifically 
excludes gifts and inheritances made by a third party.82 
This includes gifts or inheritances bequeathed by the 
spouses’ relatives, by friends, or by strangers, but excludes 
gifts or inheritances bequeathed by one of the spouses 
(whether to the other spouse or to a third party). Although 
the notion of third-party donor or testator is broad, it seems 
that the relationship most often envisaged is that of an 
ascendant83 transferring property to their descendant.  
 
The Civil Code of Québec’s predecessor was more 
precise in discussing gifts made by third parties and 
incorporated both rules applicable solely to gifts made by 
an ascendant to a descendant, and rules for other third 
parties. Article 1276 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada 
specified that gifts and inheritances composed of 
immoveable property made by ascendants of one of the 
spouses to either one of the spouses, or to both spouses, 
were deemed to have been made only to the donor’s 
                                                 
82  See Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2)(1); British Columbia FLA, supra 
note 8, s 85(1)(b.1); Family Law Act, RSA 2003, c F-4.5, s 7(2)(a); 
arts 415 al 4, 450(2) CCQ; Droit de la famille – 1463, [1991] RJQ 
2514, [1991] RDF 698 (CA). 
83  See Kouri et al, supra note 44, sub verbo “ascendant” 
(“(Pers.)  Progenitor of a person.  For ex., mother, father, 
grandparent”). 
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presumptive heir—whether the deed listed them, their 
spouse, or the couple as a recipient. As such, an 
immoveable (a house or a parcel of land, for instance) 
received by either one of the spouses or by the couple from 
the ascendant of one of them would presumptively belong 
to the spouse meant to inherit it. This presumption was 
subject to the exception of an explicit declaration by the 
donor or testator that they wished to do otherwise and grant 
the title to the spouse of their presumptive heir or the 
couple. Article 1276 further added that immoveables gifted 
to or inherited by either spouse or by the couple from any 
individual whom they were not descendants of would be 
treated in the opposite way and enter the community 
without exception. As such, the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada’s default disposition was to include all gifts and 
inheritances received from individuals unrelated to the 
couple into their joint mass of assets (the opposite of our 
current statutes’ approach), and exclude those gifts and 
inheritances made by ascendants of the spouses, taking 
special care to place them within the individual mass of 
assets of the descendant—not necessarily that of the 
intended recipient—by disregarding the name on the deed 
if need be or if insufficiently clear. The article thus stated 
a clear presumption in favour of the ascendant-descendant 
relationship. While today’s exclusions in the Civil Code of 
Québec have extended the definition of excluded gifts and 
inheritances to moveables as well as immoveables (perhaps 
as an acknowledgement that family wealth is decreasingly 
tied to land) and to gifts and inheritances by strangers as 
well as those by ascendants (perhaps conceding that 
families fit less and less in traditional moulds), the spectre 
of the family land and family house remain the historical 
backdrop for such exclusions, and the examples discussed 
by both common law and civil law authors and legislators 
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remain tied to the family and to transfers from ascendants 
to the spouses.84  
 
The Civil Code of Lower Canada’s differentiation 
of gifts and inheritances from ascendants, and those from 
nonascendants, accords with the view that gifts and 
inheritances are excluded because of the relationship 
between the donor or testator and the recipient, rather than 
because of the labour expended to acquire the gift. A third 
party external to the family was not understood to have a 
bond strong enough with the recipient to justify the gift or 
inheritance, so this transfer must have been justified by 
actions, and should be incorporated into the community. 
Even today, the exclusion must be justified by a family-like 
relationship; though today’s law incorporates a more 
inclusive and broader notion of these relationships.  
 
2. Gifts and Inheritances between Spouses 
 
Today’s inclusion of gifts between spouses in the shared 
mass of assets is justified by the concern that excluding 
such transfers would allow spouses to bypass the default 
matrimonial regimes by allowing them to exclude property 
from the shared mass of assets indirectly.85 In the past, 
                                                 
84  See e.g. Robert M Halpern, ed, Property Rights and Obligations under 
Ontario Family Law (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2002) at 494–96; 
Heakes, supra note 73 at 169, n 1 (“[t]he Gifting of real estate from 
parents to their children [is] the classical form of intergenerational 
family wealth distribution because of land’s historical position as the 
almost exclusive store of economic value in ancient society”). 
85  In the civil law, interspousal gifts are included in the shared mass of 
assets through the family patrimony (see Tétrault, supra note 2 at 227–
28; Castelli & Goubau, supra note 54 at 131; Droit de la famille – 
1463, supra note 82). In most statutes equivalent to Ontario’s Family 
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interspousal gifts have played different roles: at common 
law, gifts between spouses were impossible until wives 
became legally capable of holding and transferring 
property; gifts from a husband to his wife were void, and 
wives had no property to transfer.86 A similar limitation 
existed in some northern regions of France during the 
Ancien Régime, based not on technical limitations of legal 
capacity, but rather on a clear desire to keep the property 
of the wife’s family and that of the husband’s separate.87 
                                                 
Law Act, only gifts and inheritances from third persons are excluded 
from the shared mass of assets—interspousal gifts are thus included. 
See e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2)(1); British Columbia FLA, 
supra note 8, s 85(1)(b.1). Inheritances between spouses pose a 
different problem, unrelated to their potential inclusion in the shared 
mass of assets (as the inheritance would only come to be once the core 
of assets has ceased to exist due to the death of one spouse). Rather, 
interspousal inheritances create a problematic overlap between the 
recipient’s shared mass of assets and the inheritance that the recipient 
receives from the deceased spouse. 
86  See Hyland, supra note 74 at para 554. Note that an exception was 
possible: a husband could make a gift to the wife’s dower.  
87  See ibid at para 546 [footnotes omitted]:  
Because, at the time, a wife was not considered part of 
her husband’s family and did not inherit from him, the 
goal of the prohibition seems to have been to prevent 
property from passing between unrelated families. 
Successions law was based on lineage. The customary 
maxim was paterna paternis, materna maternis—the 
father’s property was to descend to the father’s kin and 
the mother’s to the mother’s. The marriage bed, as Le 
Roy Ladurie wrote, was simply a piece of furniture. 
The customs smiled on children, not on love. 
See also Billette, supra note 37 (“[l]’ancien droit qui ne négligeait pas 
les occasions de protéger les biens de famille et de les conserver dans 
la branche d’où ils venaient, ne manqua pas . . . [d’adopter la 
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This was the case of the Coutume de Paris, adopted in 
Quebec in 1664, and carried on to the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada.88 Other regions allowed such gifts but considered 
them revocable until the death of the donating spouse. The 
rest of France also embraced this latter practice when the 
Code civil des Français was adopted in 1804, and the 
“conservation of property within the families became a 
principle to be fought.”89  
 
The prohibition on interspousal gifts in civilian 
systems was itself inherited from Roman law.90 Women 
married under Roman law could enter one of two kinds of 
marriage: cum manu (a matrimonial regime in which their 
legal status was tied to that of their husband) or sine manu 
(in which their legal status remained tied to their father). 
The question of interspousal gifts was moot for wives 
married cum manu, as they were subsumed under their 
husband’s power (potestas) and could not own property on 
their own until their husband’s death. However, it became 
increasingly relevant as marriages sine manu became more 
                                                 
prohibition des donations entre époux], non seulement pour les 
donations, mais aussi pour les testaments” at 179). 
88  See Zoltvany, supra note 12 at 369; Gilles, supra note 36 at 121; 
arts 770, 1265 CCLC; Burman, supra note 57 at 157. See also Billette, 
supra note 37 at 179 (stating that this rule was also extended to 
testamentary gifts between spouses). But see Castelli, supra note 38 
at 416 (arguing that the prohibition of interspousal gifts was not due to 
a desire to maintain the property of the bloodlines separate, but to 
protect the spouses from being tied to a gift made in an instant of 
passion or under undue pressure from the other spouse).  
89  Billette, supra note 37 at 179 [translated by author]. See also art 1096 
CcF; Hyland, supra note 74 at para 547. 
90  See Billette, supra note 37 at 179. 
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prevalent (towards the end of the Roman Republic). 91 
Wives married sine manu became legally independent (sui 
juris) at the death of their father or the patriarch of their 
family (paterfamilias). Thus, they could own, transfer, and 
receive property while married. In such a marriage, normal 
gifts (dona) would be conceivable between spouses but 
would be subject to an absolute prohibition.92 While no 
clear justification exists for this prohibition,93 its effect was 
clearly to keep the property of each spouse’s bloodline 
separate.94 
 
3. Gifts and Inheritances to Third Parties 
 
Today’s Canadian common and civil laws do not restrict 
spouses’ ability to make gifts or select heirs (outside of 
some specific provisions meant to ensure that a spouse 
does not waste the family property before a separation in 
order to avoid its equal or fair partition).95  In contrast, 
many civilian jurisdictions maintain a regime of forced 
                                                 
91  See Hyland, supra note 74 at paras 541–42. 
92  See ibid; John P Dawson, Gifts and Promises: Continental and 
American Law Compared (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) 
at 14–15. 
93  See Hyland, supra note 74 at para 543, listing many possible 
justifications for the prohibition but noting that “none of the 
justifications was convincing, even when considered from the point of 
view of the Roman jurists.”  
94  This is the justification that John Dawson prefers: “There must have 
been another reason: much more concern than the surviving sources 
show over the diversion of assets from one family line to another, 
enriching the family of the acquisitive spouse” (Dawson, supra note 92 
at 14). 
95  See e.g. arts 422, 471 CCQ. 
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heirship inherited from Roman law, which mandates that 
the heirs of the deceased necessarily inherit a specific share 
of the estate.96 Such regimes are meant to “protect[] the 
heirs against the alienation of family resources”97 and are 
arguably working from a presumption that the property in 
question does not belong to the individual entirely, but is 
meant to belong to the family. The family is conceived as 
a bloodline (the intended heirs are the children), whose 
interests supersede those of the testator in such a case. In 
Quebec, three types of restrictions upon a spouse’s ability 
to make gifts or bequeath property to third parties outside 
the bloodline were inherited from the Ancien Régime and 
are clearly meant to protect the property of the bloodline: 
the réserve coutumière, the légitime, and the édit de 
secondes noces. There are no equivalents for these 
restrictions in the common law.  
 
Quebec inherited the réserve coutumière from 
French law, where it had evolved in the middle ages—
though, per J.-Émile Billette, it was “a tradition that went 
back to the furthest eras of civilization.” 98  The réserve 
coutumière, which has now fused with the légitime to 
                                                 
96  See Hyland, supra note 74 (“[i]f the decedent has made gratuitous 
transfers in excess of the disposable share, bequests are reduced, and, 
if that reduction proves insufficient, inter vivos gifts too are recalled” 
at para 1343). France, for instance, maintains a “réserve héréditaire” 
(art 912 C civ). 
97  Hyland, supra note 74 at para 1343. See also Germain Brière, 
Donations, substitutions et fiducie (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1988) 
at 9 (suggesting that gifts are dangerous because they can reduce the 
property that will be left to heirs, and that restrictions upon an 
individual’s ability to make gifts indirectly protects that individual’s 
family). 
98  Billette, supra note 37 at 85 [translated by author]. 
      CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 34 
create the réserve héréditaire in French law, was set aside 
in 1774 in Quebec.99 The réserve coutumière consisted of 
four fifths of an individual’s estate, which were to be 
inherited by their kin. If the property left in the deceased’s 
estate after all bequests had been subtracted was 
insufficient to cover the réserve coutumière, gifts and 
legacies to third parties would be reduced to satisfy it.100 
The purpose behind these provisions was clearly the desire 
to maintain property within the family, which was 
conceived of as kinship.101  
 
The légitime, originating from Roman law, 
reflected a moral obligation that the deceased owed to their 
descendants. 102  The légitime was calculated from the 
property that the deceased had left ab intestate and that was 
disposed of by gift or legacy. If the estate was insufficient 
to cover the minimum amount owed as the légitime, 
descendants could recall legacies as well as gifts made 
during the lifetime of the deceased in order to satisfy the 
légitime.103 Both the légitime and the réserve coutumière 
had a conception of the family centred on blood ties and 
                                                 
99  See Quebec Act, 1774 (UK), c 83, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix 
II, No 5 [Quebec Act]. See also Castelli, supra note 38 at 441. 
100  See art 292 Coutume de Paris; P-B Mignault, Le droit civil canadien, 
t 4 (Montréal: Librairie de droit et de jurisprudence, 1899) at 19; 
Billette, supra note 37 at 87. 
101  See Billette, supra note 37 at 86–87. 
102  See ibid. 
103  See art 298 Coutume de Paris; Brière, supra note 97 at 9; Mignault, 
supra note 100 at 19–21. The légitime was abolished in 1801 by the 
Acte pour expliquer et amender la Loi concernant les Testaments et 
Ordonnances de dernière volonté (UK), 41 Geo III, c 4. 
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aimed at maintaining the property inherited within that 
family.104  
 
The concern about maintaining property within 
bloodlines is particularly salient in the context of the third 
restriction inherited from the Coutume de Paris: the édit de 
secondes noces (the “édit”). The édit originated in Roman 
law and was imported into French law by statute in 1560. 
As its name suggests, this restriction upon testamentary 
freedom was concerned with spouses (in particular, 
widows) entering a second marriage. The édit’s focus was 
on ensuring that the property inherited from the deceased 
spouse not be transferred to the new spouse’s family, but 
that it be inherited (for the most part) by the children of the 
first marriage.105 The restriction intended that, upon the 
death of their remarried parent, the children of the first 
marriage would receive as large a part of this parent’s 
estate as that awarded to any individual from their parent’s 
new family.106 It also prohibited spouses who remarried 
from transferring the property of their deceased spouse to 
their new spouse by gift or bequest and from alienating this 
property to the detriment of the children from their first 
marriage.107  Thus, the édit increased the likelihood that 
property would be inherited by the children of the first 
                                                 
104  See Sylvio Normand, “La codification de 1866: contexte et impact” in 
H Patrick Glenn, ed, Droit québécois et droit français: communauté, 
autonomie, concordance (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 1993) 43 
at 50–51; Castelli, supra note 38 at 422. 
105  See Mignault, supra note 100 at 22; Billette, supra note 37 at 89.   
106  See Mignault, supra note 100 at 22–24; Brière, supra note 97 at 9; 
Billette, supra note 37 at 89. 
107  See Brière, supra note 97 at 9; Billette, supra note 37 at 89. 
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marriage, rather than be transferred into a different 
bloodline. 
 
These practices limiting individuals’ ability to 
make gifts and bequests were eventually abolished in 
Quebec due to their incompatibility with the principle of 
testamentary freedom, which, as a result of the common 
law’s influence in Quebec, was a major element of the 
reform of Quebec’s civil law when the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada was drafted. 108  The historical importance of 
freedom of testation in the common law explains the 
absence of such dispositions in common law Canada.  
 
4. Property Law and the Bloodline’s Inherited Lands 
  
The ramifications of the exclusionary logic of the bloodline 
family and of the importance of maintaining property 
(especially real property rather than its equivalent value) 
within the bloodline can be gleaned in other aspects of 
property law in both Quebec and the common law 
provinces. Until 1855, for instance, through the right of 
retrait lignager (the “retrait”), an individual whose family 
member had sold an immoveable family asset to a third 
party was able—as of right—to intervene in the transaction 
within a year and a day after its completion to reclaim that 
property (by reimbursing its purchaser).109 This right was 
only applicable to immoveables that had been owned by a 
spouse before their marriage or that they had inherited from 
an ascendant during the marriage.110 Although the retrait 
                                                 
108  See Billette, supra note 37 at 88. 
109  See Normand, supra note 104 at 50; Castelli, supra note 38 at 444. 
110  See Normand, supra note 104 at 50. 
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was rarely executed,111 its existence is a clear indication of 
the great importance attached to the link between the 
family and its property by French law, which was imported 
into Quebec with the Coutume de Paris. This was 
eloquently noted by Maximilien Bibaud in objecting to its 
abolition: 
 
Le retrait lignager était fondé sur la raison du 
sang et n’était établi que pour conserver dans 
les familles les héritages, qui en sont le relief 
et qui forment une partie des marques de leur 
ancienneté, comme l’observe notre feudiste 
canadien Cugnet. Mais nous sommes 
aujourd’hui sous un gouvernement tout 
différent de celui qui avait implanté en 
Canada toutes les vieilles institutions 
françaises. Bien loin de se montrer jaloux de 
conserver les biens dans les familles, il a 
voulu qu’on pût déshériter ses enfants sans 
raison en faveur d’un étranger, sans que ces 
héritiers naturels pussent proférer la moindre 
plainte. . . . Le retrait se trouve directement 
contraire au génie de nos compatriotes anglo 
saxons, qui les porte à éloigner tout obstacle 
à l’expédition assurée des affaires et des 
transactions, et un Anglais qui achète 
s’imagine bien devenir le propriétaire 
incommutable du fonds qu’il acquiert.112 
 
                                                 
111  See Castelli, supra note 38 at 432. 
112  Quoted in Normand, supra note 104 at 50. 
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With the retrait lignager, even the sale of property was 
thus confined to narrower limits in the interests of keeping 
property within the family bloodline. 
 
As pointed out by Bibaud, no similar right existed 
to protect heirs in the common law.113 Yet, looking at the 
kinds of interests granted to wives and husbands in 
inherited property shows that this system was also 
structured in a manner that promoted the retention of 
inherited property within the bloodline, despite wives’ 
incapacity to hold property. In Canadian common law 
jurisdictions, as long as wives had no legal status, they 
could not own personal property. Under the default regime 
(without entering into a prenuptial agreement or being the 
beneficiary of a trust) wives “w[ere] seised [of their 
freeholds], becoming entitled [instead] to their use and to 
rents and profits.” 114  A wife was no longer capable of 
disposing of the land without her husband’s consent, 
whereas he could dispose of it to the extent of his own 
interest, which was limited by curtesy if the wife had a 
child.115 If the wife died, the husband would thus have a 
life estate in the land;116 if the husband predeceased the 
wife, she would recover her rights over the land. 
Personalty, on the other hand, would pass to the husband 
upon marriage and he could dispose of it absolutely. Thus, 
while personal property would be lost to the wife upon 
marriage, there seemed to be a concern to keep real 
property in the hands of the wife if she outlived her 
                                                 
113  See Ibid. 
114  Laskin, supra note 29 at 70. 
115  See ibid at 71. 
116  See ibid at 70–71. 
MARRIED COUPLE, SINGLE RECIPIENT 
 
39 
 
husband and if the land had been gifted to her or inherited 
by her, as opposed to her husband, or to ensure that her 
descendants inherited the land if she predeceased him. This 
concern cannot simply be attributed to a desire to secure 
housing and provide for the wife’s basic needs once she 
became a widow, as the mechanism of dower was meant to 
serve this purpose.117 Rather, it might hint at a desire to 
maintain a link between the wife and her inherited or gifted 
property, with the husband’s life interest being a necessary 
element to ensure the land could be managed during their 
marriage. Once wives were granted legal personality in the 
common law, spouses lived in a de facto separate property 
regime: each continued owning the property they had 
accumulated before marriage, and each held titles to the 
property they received during the marriage. There was no 
mass of shared assets from which to exclude gifts and 
inheritances.   
 
B. Historically, Restrictions on Gift Giving and 
Testamentary Freedom Protected the Bloodline’s 
Property 
 
While the notion of joint efforts and partnership in a 
marriage is relatively new (as is that of equality between 
the spouses), the exclusion of gifts, inheritances, or 
property otherwise perceived as belonging to a bloodline 
from a common mass of assets to be divided upon the 
separation of the spouses (through divorce, death, or other 
types of circumstances) has been around since Roman Law 
at least. As we have seen, many types of provisions have 
                                                 
117  See ibid at 72–73. Dower granted the wife a life interest in one-third of 
her husband’s freeholds of inheritance if she survived him; it is deemed 
to have been replaced, mainly, with homestead legislation.  
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attempted to keep this type of property within the family, 
perceived as a bloodline, including: the réserve 
coutumière, the légitime, the édit de secondes noces, the 
prohibition of gifts between spouses, and the relabeling of 
gifts to a spouse when they are descendants of the donor or 
testator. The exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the 
common mass of assets to be divided upon a couple’s 
separation fits with the evolution of this framework and is 
arguably the newest iteration of the desire to maintain the 
property within the family-as-bloodline. The exclusion in 
today’s matrimonial regimes shares with the Civil Code of 
Lower Canada’s provisions on the relabeling of gifts or 
inheritances to a descendent spouse the fact that, although 
mandatory, it is not a prohibition: there are clearly laid out 
ways to bypass it. This can be done by the donor or testator 
if they are clear in their intent to make the gift to both 
spouses, or by the recipient if they spend, invest, or 
repurpose the gift or inheritance in such a way as to make 
it enter the joint mass of assets.118 A prenuptial or divorce 
agreement can also vary these rules, and allow the spouses 
to share the value of the gifted or inherited property.119 In 
this sense, the exclusion of gifts and inheritances found in 
current matrimonial regimes is following the trend of 
protecting the property of the bloodline by preventing the 
spouse who married into the bloodline from sharing this 
property when the marriage ends. However, current 
matrimonial regimes are also infused with a greater interest 
in the will of the spouse or spouses and respect for the will 
of the testator or donor. 
 
                                                 
118  See e.g. art 450(2) CCQ; Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2)(2). 
119  See e.g. art 431 CCQ; Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2)(6). 
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The exclusion of gifts and inheritances is a logical 
fit in Quebec civil law, given the tenuous relationship 
between French civil law and liberalities. Although 
freedom of testation had done away with much of the 
legislation restricting bequests, the mistrust towards these 
sorts of transactions—the sense that they do not quite fit 
within the structure of private law, that they are a danger to 
the family120—remains in the structure of the civil law, and 
most likely in the minds of legislators and judges. While 
the common law has done less to outlaw gratuitous 
transactions within the family, likely due to its more 
pronounced belief in freedom of testation, its historical 
reluctance to accommodate gratuitous transactions 
certainly suggests that, in seeking inspiration from the civil 
law’s regime for family property law, this exclusion 
seemed like a logical fit. The fact that the exclusion is one 
of the most consistent aspects of Canadian matrimonial 
regimes is, consequently, not surprising and conveys a 
message about the law’s current conception of families and 
the individuals that compose them. The exclusion of gifts 
and inheritances from the shared mass of assets has a 
symbolic and communicative value as much as it does a 
practical one. As such, we ought to consider whether this 
exclusion has struck the right balance between the 
promotion of autonomy and equality of the spouses, 
freedom of testation, and the promotion of marriage as a 
partnership. 
 
                                                 
120  See Hyland, supra note 74 at 9–10 (“[t]he survival of the family as an 
institution seems to depend on confining gift giving within narrow 
limits” at 10). 
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III. EXCLUDING GIFTS AND INHERITANCES 
TODAY: PRIORITIZING BLOODLINE OVER 
PARTNERSHIP? 
 
The reforms to matrimonial regimes in Canada introduced 
many new notions into both the civil and common law 
traditions. While the regime of acquests was an old 
structure imported from the Ancien Régime, it was a 
revolutionary regime to introduce into the common law. 
The family patrimony was just as revolutionary in the civil 
law; there is still no equivalent to it in France or other civil 
law jurisdictions. Contrasting with these innovations is the 
exclusion of gifts and inheritances, an awkward fit that 
imports the remnants of the old system into the new: the 
maintenance of gifted and inherited property within the 
bloodlines into a system that values partnership, equity, 
sharing, and choice. The justification of this exclusion of 
gifts and inheritances as not resulting from the joint efforts 
of the couple rests on the traditional notion of the family as 
bloodline. Thus, the current system sends messages that are 
imprinted with this anachronism. Parts I and II of this 
article analyzed in some depth the exclusion of gifts and 
inheritances from matrimonial regimes and its origins. 
Part III will now take a step back and focus on the 
trajectory of the private law’s conception of the family by 
using a framework presented by the works of Mireille 
Castelli and Christine Morin in the context of the law of 
successions (Part III-A). We will then transpose our 
previous analysis of the exclusion of gifts and inheritances 
into this framework (Part III-B) and find that the exclusion 
of gifts and inheritances from the shared mass of assets is 
indeed an outlier that should perhaps be addressed 
(Part III-C). 
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A. Succession Law and the Family: Shifting the 
Balance between Blood, Individual, and Couple 
 
In an analysis of succession law published in 1973, Mireille 
Castelli put forward three conceptions of individuals’ 
relationships with their patrimony, which she used to study 
the evolution of succession law in Quebec and France since 
the Coutume de Paris. 121  Christine Morin, in a thesis 
published in 2008, used this same framework to analyze 
the evolution of succession law until recently. 122  Both 
authors used this framework to study an individual’s 
relationship to their property in the civil law through the 
prism of the patrimony which is at the heart of the civilian 
concept of property. However, the three conceptions of the 
relationship between individual and property that they 
describe can easily be transposed to the couple in both the 
civil and common law. The three conceptions outlined by 
Castelli are the those tied to the bloodline (conception 
lignagère ou familiale, according to which the property 
owned by an individual is also the subject of rights 
belonging to members of the individual’s bloodline 
family), the individual (conception personnelle, whereby 
only the individual holds rights to their property), and the 
couple (conception conjugale, which considers that the 
property of an individual is in some ways “co-owned” and 
meant to profit their spouse).123  
 
The bloodline conception was the prevalent 
framework in the Coutume de Paris, which had put in place 
                                                 
121  See Castelli, supra note 38. 
122  See Morin, supra note 53. 
123  See Castelli, supra note 38 at 413–17. 
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multiple structures to ensure that property remain within 
the bloodline family. 124  The personal conception is 
reflected in the abolition of some restrictions on gift-giving 
and inheritance law, such as the lifting of the prohibition of 
interspousal bequests with the 1774 Quebec Act,125 which 
Castelli attributes to the fact that that legislator no longer 
feared the mixing of bloodlines’ property.126 According to 
the author, this is an intermediary stage, where the family 
remains more closely associated with the bloodline than the 
couple or the marriage. The conjugal conception would 
consider the spouse’s property as destined for the use of the 
family, which is then conceived of as mainly the couple, 
and to some extent their children.127 The conception of the 
bloodline family needs to be shed in order for the conjugal 
conception to take hold. 128  Castelli argues that the 
emergence of the conjugal conception in Quebec is  tied to 
the great mobility of its population; as a result, husbands 
often placed their wives in charge of their affairs and 
property while they were away, and made them their 
universal legatee.129 Morin sees the conjugal conception 
reflected most strongly in the reforms leading to the 
                                                 
124  See Castelli, supra note 38 at 413–14. See also above, Part II-A, for an 
overview of these measures. Castelli point out, however, that these 
legislated provisions were in conflict with the individualistic practice 
of Quebeckers (see ibid at 414). See also Christine Morin, supra 
note 53 at 74–78. 
125  Supra, note 99. See Castelli, supra note 38 at 433; Christine Morin, 
supra note 53 at 80. 
126  See Castelli, supra note 38 at 415. 
127  See ibid at 416, 474. 
128  See ibid at 417. 
129  See ibid at 466. 
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creation of the family patrimony: although the Civil Code 
of Québec continues to conceive of the patrimony as 
individual, “the Code confers a conjugal character to the 
property that composes the family patrimony since their 
value is divisible between the spouses at the end of their 
union and the owner cannot oppose themselves to the 
division.”130 The family patrimony accords with Castelli’s 
conjugal conception since it takes the spouse in 
consideration first and foremost, and while children may 
benefit indirectly from the family patrimony they are not 
its intended beneficiaries.  
 
According to Castelli and Morin, the Coutume de 
Paris therefore symbolically embodied the bloodline 
conception through the instruments we have analyzed in 
Part II-A, although in practice Quebeckers have always 
been tied more closely to the individual conception. The 
conjugal conception would also have roots that extend to 
the beginning of the colony, although its growth has been 
slower than that of the individual conception, and it has 
only flowered with the creation of the family patrimony. 
 
B. Excluding Gifts and Inheritances: Primacy of Blood 
or Spouse’s Choice?  
 
There is no doubt that the provisions from the Coutume de 
Paris, Roman law, and the structure of property law in 
common law studied in Part II-A, above, subscribe exactly 
to what Castelli termed the conception lignagère, where 
“spouses are . . . above all else, members of two different 
                                                 
130  Christine Morin, supra note 53 at 355–56 [translated by author]. 
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families with opposing interests.” 131  The notion of the 
family as a bloodline suggests that we consider the family 
in terms of ascendants and descendants, or the vertical 
relations on a family tree, rather than the horizontal links 
that connect spouses. The historical examples of 
prohibitions of interspousal gifts (found in both civil and 
common law) or the re-classification of a gift upon 
separation in the Civil Code of Lower Canada clearly point 
to a fear of letting the property of a bloodline fall into the 
hands of another through marriage, and the prioritization 
of the bloodline over the marriage (even at a time when the 
most common reason for ending a marriage was death, 
rather than separation or divorce).  
 
The promise of equality that came with the 
abolition of the husband’s overarching personality and 
authority over the household, and that of the differential 
duties of the spouses, brought with it the suggestion that 
spouses be seen as individuals in marriage, that their 
individual personality and rights not be affected by the fact 
of marriage, nor their chance to an equal share in the 
couples’ property upon divorce. With their own rights and 
personality, spouses are perceived as individuals in society, 
outside of the couple where before only the husband was 
able to bind the family. The fact that spouses retain the 
property they had before marriage in their individual mass 
of assets is a testament to this focus on the individual, as is 
matrimonial regimes’ unanimous decision to keep damages 
for personal injury as part of individual masses of 
                                                 
131  Castelli, supra note 38 at 467 [translated by author]. 
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property.132 Reforms first to succession law and then to 
matrimonial regimes in Quebec and in the common law 
have indeed, as Castelli and Morin suggest, done away 
with many of the restrictions to gift giving and freedom of 
testation, in a move that is suggestive of the individual or 
personal conception put forward by Castelli. Where gifts 
and inheritances are concerned, the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada, the Civil Code of Québec, and the common law 
have all made space over the past few decades for the will 
of the spouses to override that of the donor and allow for 
the mixing and transfer of property between the bloodlines 
during and at the end of marriage.  
 
Moreover, in putting forward a definition of 
marriage that equates the couple with a partnership, our 
current matrimonial regimes appear to be embracing the 
conjugal conception: the notion of “partnership” values the 
joint efforts of the two spouses and divides the property 
between them under the assumption that the partners 
desired it to be shared. The mandatory sharing of the family 
patrimony, in particular, pushes this conception the 
furthest. While we agree with Morin’s assertion that the 
idea of the family patrimony truly embodies the conjugal 
conception, 133  and indeed find that this conception is 
present to some extent in all Canadian matrimonial 
regimes, the content of the family patrimony and of the 
shared mass of assets in the statutory regimes, in our 
opinion, mitigates this conception.  
 
                                                 
132  See e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2)(3); British Columbia FLA, 
supra note 8, s 85(1)(c); Northwest Territories FLA, supra note 22, 
s 35(2)(b); art 454 al 1 CCQ. 
133  See Christine Morin, supra note 53 at 355–56. 
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Even though spouses can transfer property between 
bloodlines much more freely today than they could ever 
before, a clear act is still required to transfer property from 
a spouse’s individual mass of assets to the joint mass: the 
default is still that which respects the separation of property 
coming from bloodlines. Moreover, the current system 
requires that to maintain their inherited or gifted property 
as part of the individual mass of assets, a spouse must make 
“selfish” choices in handling that property: if it is used to 
benefit the couple or their children the gifted or inherited 
property will join the shared mass of property. If it is 
managed separately, it will remain in the recipient spouse’s 
individual mass of assets. Thus, as far as this exclusion is 
concerned, the family-as-bloodline remains the default 
conception of the family, and the individual conception is 
introduced only by the recipient’s clear choice. The 
conjugal conception is only a side-effect of this choice; that 
is, the property will only belong to the couple if an 
individual choice is made by the spouse to spend it for that 
purpose. 
 
It strikes us that while the regimes prima facie put 
forward a conception that matches a conjugal 
understanding of the family and of spouses’ relationship 
with their property, the exclusion of inherited and gifted 
property from the shared mass of assets is an anachronism 
that draws the spouse back to a bloodline conception of the 
family. As stated by Castelli, “[i]t is thus that even some 
institutions which, at first sight, would seem very 
favourable to partners and in contradiction with our 
affirmation, prove to be, in fact, deviations of old 
institutions which tend towards a conception tied to 
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bloodlines.” 134  We believe that the exclusion of 
inheritances and gifts from the shared mass of assets in 
current matrimonial regimes forms one of these institutions 
which, although they seem at first glance in accordance 
with the ethos of the matrimonial regimes, are remnants of 
ancient institutions and carry with them the equally ancient 
concept of family equated to bloodlines. In our opinion, the 
presence of this anachronism undermines the importance 
granted to both the individual conception (notions of 
autonomy and choice) and the conjugal conception 
(notions of equity and sharing) that are also embedded in 
the matrimonial regimes. 
 
C. Remnants of the Bloodline: Reconsidering the 
Exclusion of Gifts and Inheritances 
 
We return to a question asked at the outset of this article: 
insofar as our matrimonial property regimes’ exclusion of 
inheritances and gifts is the remnant of a conception that 
equates the family with the spouse’s bloodline, do we find 
that our legislation and its structure conceives of the couple 
as a unit, as a set of individuals, or as the temporary joining 
of two separate families? Moreover, if there is a 
disconnection between the objective and the conception set 
out by the regimes, and that embodied by the exclusion of 
gifts and inheritances, what ought to be done to remedy it?  
 
Our current regimes clearly state that they consider 
the couple a form of partnership, and their property as the 
result of their joint endeavours. The matrimonial regimes 
and the Civil Code of Québec provide that spouses ought 
to contribute equally to the partnership, in accordance with 
                                                 
134  Castelli, supra note 38 at 413 [translated by author]. 
      CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 50 
their means.135  The definition is purposive: the spouses 
contribute to the partnership and they have a common goal. 
The way in which the shared masses of assets are populated 
is also purposive: assets that are acquired while the couple 
is married are presumed to be acquired to serve the family; 
assets that would be part of the individual mass of property 
but are spent on the family join the common mass of assets. 
The purpose of the partnership is thus the wellbeing of the 
family, as the family of choice, the couple, and, where 
applicable, their descendants. In their daily lives, the 
spouses retain their individuality in their activities, but the 
purpose of these activities is centred on the family as a unit, 
which is reflected in the deferred-sharing scheme. 
Marriage under the default Canadian regimes thus sees the 
couple as a hybrid between a set of individuals and a 
nuclear family unit, the personal and the conjugal 
conceptions. 136  The mandatory family patrimony of 
Quebec, however, embodies a stronger notion of unity, 
both symbolically due to its name, as well as practically 
due to its mandatory nature. The term “patrimony” is the 
name, in civil law, of the metaphorical container that each 
person has and in which they carry the property they own. 
The term has a close affiliation with the notion of 
personality: each person has one and only one patrimony, 
and each patrimony is associated with only one person.137 
                                                 
135  See e.g. art 396 CCQ. 
136  In Castelli’s perspective, the state of the law concerning liberalities in 
1970s Quebec already matched the conjugal conception (Castelli, 
supra note 38 at 472). We note, however, that Castelli’s focus was 
solely on the law of successions, whereas our focus on matrimonial 
regimes and its interaction with liberalities paints a slightly different 
picture. 
137  See art 2 CCQ.  
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The notion of family patrimony thus suggests that the Civil 
Code of Québec looks at the family as it would a person.138 
The exclusion of inheritances and gifts is all the more 
jarring in the current context, because it speaks to a 
conception of the couple not as a set of individuals or a 
unit, but as a pair of separate families joining for period of 
time, while attempting to keep their property separate.  
 
Let us return to a comment by Castelli: “[r]eleasing 
the patrimony from the shackles of the conception of 
bloodlines and its causes . . . is the most essential step 
towards admitting the partner into the family.”139 Could we 
argue that the exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the 
shared mass of assets is one such obstruction which 
prevents the spouses from fully entering one another’s 
families—or the family which they create together?  
 
If the exclusion of gifts and inheritances is a 
remnant of a conception of the family that our matrimonial 
legislation has shed in the pursuit of granting greater 
freedom of testation and equality regardless of gender—as 
we have argued that it is—we might indeed wonder 
whether excluding gifts and inheritances in today’s 
regimes is still desirable. On the one hand, we might 
consider that gifts and inheritances are often the marker of 
a symbolic and emotional attachment between an 
individual and a lost loved one. 140  Would it be fair to 
                                                 
138  The language of “family patrimony” is currently used in Quebec as 
well as in Yukon’s French version of the Family Property and Support 
Act (supra note 16).  
139  Castelli, supra note 38 at 417 [translated by author]. 
140  See Générosa Bras-Miranda, “La couleur des biens hérités” in 
Générosa Bras-Miranda & Benoît Moore, eds, Mélanges Adrian 
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require that a divorcing spouse have to potentially separate 
from the last tangible memory they have of a parent, just as 
the family they have created together with their spouse is 
disintegrating? Might we wish to draw a distinction 
between gifts and inheritances that are likely to hold 
significant monetary value rather than emotional?141  On 
the other hand, our understanding of what “family” means 
evolves with our society, and is increasingly inclusive: 
marriage no longer takes account of sex or gender; de facto 
spouses are treated as spouses whose relationship has been 
formalized for the purposes of most legislation on family 
law outside of Quebec; rules on filiation are increasingly 
inclusive across the country; and kinship and ties created 
otherwise than by blood are playing a growing role in 
legacies.142 In such a context, do we want to maintain an 
exclusion which, while attempting to keep the memory of 
a deceased loved one alive by keeping aside and intact the 
property they have left a spouse,143 perpetuates the notion 
that blood is the basis for defining families? 
 
 
                                                 
Popovici : les couleurs du droit (Montréal: Thémis, 2009) 11 at 14, 
20–21; Jacques Beaulne, Droit des successions, 5th ed (Montréal: 
Wilson & Lafleur, 2016) at para 12. 
141  See Jean Carbonnier, “Le statut des bijoux dans le droit matrimonial” 
in Raymond Verdier, dir, Écrits (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2010) 403 at 420 (arguing that jewelry received as a gift during 
marriage cannot be considered family heirlooms due to their monetary 
value). 
142  See e.g. Sue Westwood, “Complicating Kinship and Inheritance: Older 
Lesbians' and Gay Men's Will-Writing in England” (2015) 23:2 Fem 
Leg Stud 181. 
143  See Bras-Miranda, supra note 140 at 29. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Current matrimonial regimes are the result of an attempt to 
infuse matrimonial law with substantive, rather than 
formal, equality among spouses upon their divorce or 
separation. The introduction of divorce in federal 
legislation, followed by high-profile cases showcasing the 
unequal and unfair results of contemporary matrimonial 
regimes, have led to multiple reforms of the default 
matrimonial regimes in all Canadian provinces and 
territories, constructed around the idea of marriage as an 
economic partnership. In the context of these reforms, the 
exclusion of gifts and inheritances has been justified on the 
basis that such property is not born from the common 
efforts of the spouses. Our analysis of the tenuous 
relationship gifts and inheritances entertain with married 
couples has endeavoured to show that if these gratuitous 
transactions cannot be justified by the spouses’ efforts, it is 
because private law has repeatedly considered them in the 
context of transfers from ascendants to descendants and has 
consistently raised obstacles to gratuitous transactions 
outside of this relationship. 
 
Our analysis has focused on the married couple, 
which, according to our current matrimonial regimes, is a 
partnership of joint endeavours that carries with it a sense 
of equity and sharing, and a common goal—the wellbeing 
of the family. Yet, our regimes still exclude gifts and 
inheritances made to only one spouse, the single recipient: 
when it comes to gifts and inheritances, the regimes forget 
the marriage and turn to old habits and conceptions; the 
spouse is no longer a half of a couple, or even a single 
individual, but a family member belonging to a bloodline, 
the property of which is to be protected. In our view, this 
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exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the shared mass of 
assets of married couples is the symbol of an outdated 
conception of marriage and the family, a remnant that 
should lead us to question how we understand what 
constitutes a family and how we can foster equality, equity, 
and solidarity within that framework. 
 
 
